Humans have an extremely flexible ability to categorize regularities in their environment, in part because of attentional systems that allow them to focus on important perceptual information. In formal theories of categorization, attention is typically modeled with weights that selectively bias the processing of stimulus features. These theories make differing predictions about the degree of flexibility with which attention can be deployed in response to stimulus properties. Results from 2 eye-tracking studies show that humans can rapidly learn to differently allocate attention to members of different categories. These results provide the first unequivocal demonstration of stimulus-responsive attention in a categorization task. Furthermore, the authors found clear temporal patterns in the shifting of attention within trials that follow from the informativeness of particular stimulus features. These data provide new insights into the attention processes involved in categorization.
The broadest definition of categorization is to respond appropriately to regularities in the environment. All organisms need to do this if they are to survive. For example, when the water flea Daphnia magna encounters light with a wavelength of less than 400 nm, it moves downward through the water to avoid being damaged (Storz & Paul, 1998) . Such hardwired categorization abilities, however, can apply only to regularities that are stable over evolutionary time scales, like the properties of electromagnetic radiation. Organisms that are capable of learning can improve the flexibility of their categorizations, responding to regularities that shift within generations; this flexibility can be further improved with attentional mechanisms that selectively emphasize features likely to be diagnostic for particular categorization tasks (Nosofsky, 1986) . The present studies investigate some of the properties of learned attentional allocation in categorization.
Humans have a particularly flexible attentional system, even compared to other primates (Fagot, Kruschke, Dépy, & Vauclai, 1998; Smith, Minda, & Washburn, 2004; Tomasello, 1999) . People can learn attentional allocations that are appropriate for particular categorization tasks but can also switch allocations if the task changes (Kruschke, 1996) . People are even sensitive to changes in the diagnosticity of features within a single task and can adjust their attention accordingly, though with some delay (Edgell & Morrissey, 1987) .
In formal theories of categorization, learned attention is typically implemented as weights that bias the influence of perceptual features or dimensions. In categorizations that are simple, distinguishing elephants from butterflies for instance, the stimuli differ on many dimensions, and it hardly matters which features are emphasized. On the other hand, attending to the right features is more important for discriminations where the relevant dimensions are less obvious. For example, color is more useful than size in discriminating lemons from limes. In a categorization model, color information would be emphasized by increasing its influence on the categorization decision. In many category-learning models, there is a single set of attentional weights for a particular task (Kruschke, 1992; Love, Medin, & Gureckis, 2004; Minda & Smith, 2002; Nosofsky, 1986) , an implementation that might be called task-specific attention. This implementation restricts attentional flexibility. Attention is deployed to the most relevant features for performing the task as a whole, but it cannot be shifted on the basis of the features of the particular stimulus that is being categorized. For a model using task-specific attention to distinguish lemons from limes, for example, the degree to which it emphasizes color over size is independent of the properties of the particular lime or lemon that is being categorized, producing a one-size-fits-all attentional allocation.
Other theories of categorization implement learned attention in ways that allow more flexibility.
1 Different attentional weights can be attached to groups of similar stimuli (Love & Jones, 2006) or even to individual stimuli (Aha & Goldstone, 1992; Kruschke, 2001 ) within a task. This means that attention can be tailored not only for the task as a whole, but for particular stimuli as well. Because the properties of the stimulus can influence the deployment of learned attention, such models might be said to have stimulus-responsive attention (SRA).
2 Models that have SRA can emphasize color when distinguishing lemons from limes but can also shift the emphasis to other features, such as size, if the lemon they are categorizing is unripe and greenish. Thus, SRA allows people to respond to both task-level and stimulus-level regularities.
Turning from models of categorization to actual human behavior, the question is, just how flexible is learned attention, really? A few studies have investigated the issue. Aha and Goldstone (1992) taught participants categories with a complex structure that was meant to elicit SRA. In one part of the stimulus space, the two categories differed on one dimension, whereas in another part of the space, they differed on another dimension but overlapped on the first dimension. In other words, the categories had a horizontal boundary in one part of the two-dimensional stimulus space and a vertical boundary in the other. During a transfer task, participants classified new stimuli in accordance with the closest boundary, the obvious implication being that they emphasized one dimension for some stimuli and the other dimension for other stimuli. Aha and Goldstone further demonstrated that the data were better fit by a model capable of SRA than by models using task-specific attention. This result is certainly suggestive. There are two important limitations to this study, however. First, the SRA-capable model was more complex than the others, which makes it difficult to draw strong conclusions about the nature of human abilities from the model fits because more complex models tend to fit any data better (Pitt, Myung, & Zhang, 2002; Roberts & Pashler, 2000) . Furthermore, even if the flexibility that results from stimulus responsivity is necessary to account for their results, it is not clear that this flexibility must be located in the attentional system per se.
This problem is clearly demonstrated in work by Rodrigues and Murre (2007) . They compared four categorization models on data from a rule-plus-exception categorization task. Two of the models incorporated task-specific attention, and two incorporated more flexible mechanisms: One model had stimulus-specific attentional weights (enabling SRA), and the other had stimulus-responsive exemplar sensitivity parameters (allowing individual exemplars in memory to have different sensitivity parameters that influence the similarity calculations with the to-be-classified stimulus). Both stimulus-responsive models fit the data better than the taskspecific versions, but it is impossible to say whether it is attention or memory that is responsible for the flexibility participants showed in their responses. Therefore, although people may act more flexibly than the simpler task-specific models can account for, the results of model fitting often do not allow one to identify the source of this flexibility. What is needed is a more direct measure of attention.
Eye-tracking has a long history of use in cognitive science (Yarbis, 1967) , notably in research on visual search (Liversedge & Findlay, 2000) and especially on reading where gaze data have been critical to theory development for 3 decades (Rayner, 1998) . Though its use in the study of selective attention in categorization began only a few years ago with work by Rehder and Hoffman (2005a) , eye-tracking has already been shown to be a useful measure of attentional allocation, one that links neatly to the selective attention components of current computational models. Rehder and Hoffman (2005b) have shown that the amount of time people spend looking at stimulus features correlates with attentional weights generated by fitting models to the response data. In work related to categorization, Kruschke, Kappenman, and Hetrick (2005) , using fixation duration as a measure of attention in conditioning studies of blocking and highlighting, showed surprisingly consistent individual participant differences in attentional flexibility across tasks and, further, showed that these differences were related to the attentional shifting parameters generated through model fitting.
Although eye-tracking certainly cannot provide insight into all cognitive processes -for example, Anderson, Bothell, and Douglass (2004) argued that it cannot be used as an index of memory retrieval processes-it is an uncontroversial measure of overt attention (muscular movements that orient sensory organs to selectively access information in the environment). Thus, studies that use eye-tracking directly measure one form of attention and can thereby overcome some of the limitations introduced by inferring attention from model fits or categorization responses. There are still important limitations: Obviously eye-tracking cannot provide a direct measure of any of the numerous forms of covert attention (the biasing of neural processes by other neural processes). However, there is generally thought to be a tight coupling between overt and covert attentional processes under normal conditions. Although shifts of overt attention are not necessary for shifts of covert attention, shifts of covert attention are necessary for shifts of overt attention (Shepard, Findlay, & Hockey, 1986) , and several studies using a variety of cognitive tasks have shown a close link between covert attentional processes and eye movements (see Liversedge & Findlay, 2000; Rayner, 1998 , for reviews). Eyetracking, then, gives us a direct measurement of one form of attention and a reasonably good estimate of some others.
What do eye-tracking studies say about SRA? Rehder and Hoffman (2005b) explored eye-tracking as a method of assessing the accuracy of the predicted attentional weights for exemplar and prototype models when applied to Medin and Schaffer's (1978) 5/4 categorization task. As an additional analysis, they also looked for evidence of SRA but found none. Rehder and Hoffman speculated that the 5/4 category structure did not offer requisite performance improvements to elicit complex attentional allocations.
1 Some models do not make explicit use of selective attention mechanisms; therefore, predictions can only be intuitively derived. For example, Rehder and Hoffman (2005a) provided some discussion of deriving predictions about attentional allocations from rule-based models. Other models use attentional mechanisms (e.g., the ATRIUM model uses representational attention; Erickson & Kruschke, 1998 ) that differ from the dimensional attention that is the focus of our studies. We take up the latter in the General Discussion section.
2 Researchers have used the term stimulus-specific attention (Kruschke, 2001) , but this may be taken to refer strictly to a specific implementation that connects attentional weights to memories of previously encountered stimuli. Our use of the term stimulus-responsive attention is meant to be more inclusive: Any attentional allocations that are chosen in response to the stimuli could be considered stimulus responsive. Kruschke et al. (2005) , in contrast, provided eye-gaze data that could be interpreted as SRA. They evaluated attentional explanations of the associative-learning phenomena of blocking and highlighting. Kruschke et al.'s explanation of highlighting involves participants shifting their attention away from a cue that had been previously associated with a different outcome. In support of this hypothesis, they found that people allocate more attention to that cue in the context of a second cue associated with the initially learned outcome and allocate less attention to that cue in the context of a cue associated with an outcome learned later. There are many differences between Kruschke et al.'s conditioning tasks and a standard object categorization task: The cues are words, there are no inherent dimensions, there is no single coherent object being classified, there are numerous possible associates to each stimulus rather than just a few possible categories, and these possibilities shift from trial to trial. Nevertheless, these results demonstrate a flexible deployment of attention based on the information present in the display. It seems plausible that attention could be just as flexible in categorization tasks as it appears to be in the conditioning tasks that Kruschke et al. used. To summarize, although several prominent models of categorization incorporate task-specific attention and several incorporate SRA, the existing evidence, either for SRA or against it, is inconclusive. Both modeling work in categorization and human conditioning studies provide suggestive evidence that participants may be able to use SRA, but in the only straightforward categorization study where researchers used a direct measure of attention to look for evidence of SRA, none was found (Rehder & Hoffman, 2005b) . The goal of the present studies is to elicit SRA and measure it directly with eye-tracking, thereby falsifying the hypothesis that learned attention in visual categorization is only task specific.
Most experimental categorization tasks use only two categories. In the typical two-category experiment, if there is a particular attentional allocation that gives the best probability of determining whether a stimulus belongs to Category 1, the same allocation can be used to determine whether the stimulus does not belong to Category 1 and hence belongs to Category 2. Consequently, even if people could use SRA, there is no incentive to do so in these cases. 3 In the experiments reported here, by contrast, participants learned to categorize stimuli with three binary-valued dimensions (see Figure 1A ) into one of four categories. To maximize the chances of eliciting SRA, we used categories for which certain features were irrelevant to correctly classifying stimuli from some but not all categories. For example, in Experiment 1, Category A was defined solely by a particular value of Feature 1, Category B by values of Features 1 and 2, and Categories C and D were defined by particular values of all three features (see Figure 1B) . SRA would be beneficial in this task because it is more efficient to attend less to stimulus features that are irrelevant for classifying a given stimulus, even though the features might be necessary for classifying stimuli from other categories.
Participants' eye movements were tracked throughout the experiment. The measure of attentional allocation was the average duration that participants fixated on each of the three stimulus features for a trial. If participants could learn to flexibly attend to the stimuli in a stimulus-responsive manner, then we would expect them to deploy attention differently for stimuli from different categories. The amount of time spent gazing at the three stimulus features on a given trial should depend on the relevant stimulus features, which, because of the category structure, differ across categories. If, instead, task-specific theories are correct, then participants could not learn to flexibly deploy attention on the basis of stimulus properties, and we would expect them to have the same attentional allocation to stimuli from all categories. This might take the form of equal attention across all features, because they were all necessary for at least some of the stimuli, or it might take the form of a bias toward gazing at the features that were relevant for the most stimuli; in either case, the allocation of attention should not vary with the category of the stimulus. Because the differences in attentional allocation would presumably be greatest after the participant had mastered the task, we measured attentional allocations after each participant had met a learning criterion.
Experiment 1

Methods
Participants. Participants were 27 students at Simon Fraser University who received course credit or pay for their participation. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Stimuli. The stimuli were designed to resemble amoeba-like micro-organisms containing three features that resembled organelles. Individual features varied between one of two binary options, allowing for eight combinations. These eight combinations were overlaid on backgrounds that were different on each trial, which meant that although each of the eight possible feature combinations was presented many times in the experiment, each image presented (the stimulus features plus background) was unique. Differences in the primary features can be seen in Figure  1A , as can representative differences in the backgrounds. Features were always presented in the same location for a particular par- ticipant, but the location and relevance of the different features was counterbalanced across participants. Images were 25.4 cm in diameter when displayed, subtending approximately 24°of visual angle with participants seated 61 cm from the monitor. Features subtended 2°-4°and were located 12°apart.
Procedure. Experiment 1 consisted of a series of categorization trials in which a fixation cross appeared, participants clicked on the cross, a stimulus was displayed, participants identified it as belonging to one of four categories, and response feedback was given. To minimize visual distractions, response buttons were not displayed during initial stimulus presentation. Participants clicked the mouse button when they were ready to respond; the stimulus then disappeared, and each of the four response buttons appeared in a random corner of the screen (this random arrangement was to avoid predictive saccades). Once a participant responded, the stimulus reappeared along with response feedback. If participants reached a learning criterion of 24 consecutive errorless trials, the experiment continued for a further 72 trials; otherwise, the experiment ended after 200 trials. A Tobii ϫ50 eye tracker sampling at 50 Hz was used to record gaze data. We used a modified dispersion threshold algorithm with thresholds of 28 pixels and 75 ms to identify fixations (Salvucci & Goldberg, 2000) . Fixations were considered to be on a stimulus feature if they fell within 100 pixels (4°) of the center of the feature.
Results and Discussion
After a short training period, most participants were able to categorize the stimuli perfectly, reaching the learning criterion after an average of 109 trials. This learning criterion does not discriminate between categories, but it is unlikely that all categories were learned at the same time. We identified, for each category, the trial on which participants made their first of six consecutive correct responses to stimuli of this category. On average Category A was learned first, after 34 trials. Categories B, C, and D were learned in 44, 60, and 70 trials, respectively. This order is to be expected, because it corresponds to the number of features necessary to classify stimuli from each category, a rough measure of difficulty. Nine participants never reached the learning criterion and were analyzed separately.
Analyzing the data to investigate the existence of SRA entailed comparing participants' allocations of attention across the different categories in the experiment. Because Categories C and D had the same relevant and irrelevant dimensions, we collapsed across these categories. The allocation of attention was measured as mean total fixation duration to each of the three stimulus features during the 72 trials after the learning criterion. Participants were 99% accurate during these trials. Figure 2A shows attentional allocations to Category A, B, and C/D stimuli. A 3 ϫ 3 analysis of variance (ANOVA) with feature and category as within-subject variables revealed a statistically significant Feature ϫ Category interaction, F(4, 68) ϭ 15.12, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .47. Participants attended differently to stimuli from different categories, an unambiguous demonstration of SRA. The main effect of feature was not significant, but the main effect of category was, F(2, 34) ϭ 24.42, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .59. Category C/D stimuli were viewed longer than Category B stimuli ( p Ͻ .001), and Category B stimuli were viewed longer than Category A stimuli ( p Ͻ .01). This result was closely echoed by the results of a within-subjects ANOVA with reaction times, F(2, 52) ϭ 16.25, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .38. Category A stimuli (M ϭ 1,871 ms) were categorized faster than Category B stimuli (M ϭ 2,431 ms; p Ͻ .001) and faster than Category C/D stimuli (M ϭ 2,551 ms; p Ͻ .001), although Categories B and C/D were not significantly different from one another. Reaction times are longer than the sum of the feature fixations. The differences are due to time spent looking at the fixation cross that appeared at the beginning of each trial, as well as to saccades and moments during the trial where the eye tracker could not accurately measure the participants' gaze direction (e.g., blinks).
We expected to find participants attending comparatively little to features that were irrelevant to a particular decision (Features 2 and 3 for Category A, Feature 3 for Category B). As can be seen in Figure 2A , this was the case for Category A trials; an ANOVA looking for differences in looking times for the three features of the Category A stimuli showed a significant effect, F(2, 34) ϭ 9.886, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .37. Pairwise comparisons confirmed that Feature 1 was viewed longer than Feature 2 ( p Ͻ .05) and Feature 3 ( p Ͻ .01) and that Features 2 and 3 were not significantly different from one another. For stimuli from Category B, things were different, because participants were likely to attend to Feature 3 toward the end of the trial. Although there was a marginally significant difference in the amount of time participants fixated on each feature, F(2, 34) ϭ 3.19, p Ͻ .10, p 2 ϭ .16, there was no significant difference between the amount of time participants fixated on Feature 1, which was relevant, and on Feature 3, which was not ( p Ͼ .1). Frankly, we are puzzled by this. One possibility is that the chain of attentional shifts became overtrained, and so once this chain began with the shift from Feature 1 to Feature 2, people were likely to follow it to its unnecessary conclusion. This could be tested in a future experiment by adopting a similar category structure with additional features, to see if participants always continue to shift their attention along the same path, even when it is no longer necessary to do so. Certainly it suggests that although attention is flexible, there may be limits to how flexible. It also suggests that optimal attentional deployment is not necessarily quick and easy to learn.
Beyond establishing that participants demonstrated SRA, the eye-tracking data reveal how participants access stimulus information as they make their categorization decision. No model of categorization that we are aware of even attempts to describe attention at this subtrial level. Therefore, our aim is to describe how participants allocate attention over time, rather than to falsify any particular model. We created a plot of the probability that a particular feature was being fixated as a trial unfolded in time. Because the trials were of different lengths, we plotted time as a percentage of the length of each trial and then collapsed across the 72 postcriterion trials, which were sorted by the category to which the stimulus belonged (again collapsing C and D trials). Figure 3 shows the deployment of attention through the course of a categorization trial. Graphs begin with fixation probabilities at close to zero because most participants were looking at the fixation cross in order to click on it. Participants' attentional allocations unfolded in a noisy but predictable pattern throughout individual trials. Numerically, they were more likely to attend to Feature 1 first, to Feature 2 next (if necessary), and finally to Feature 3. Thus, at any given time, participants tended to group attentional shifts in an ordered sequence, beginning with the most informative feature (Feature 1) and shifting to progressively less informative features. This ordered temporal pattern of attentional allocation differs substantially from what was found early in training (Figure 3 , bottom), which showed no discernible regularities.
To verify that the probabilities were indeed changing over time in a manner inconsistent with chance, we ran several ANOVAs on the fixation probabilities, which we grouped into 12 bins. Features (1-3) and time (1-12) were used as within-subjects variables. For all categories, the Features ϫ Time interaction was significant, confirming that fixation probabilities changed throughout a categorization trial: Category A stimuli, F(22, 374) 2 ϭ .30. We also investigated individual differences between the shifts in attentional allocations over time. For each of the 12 bins (see ANOVA just described), we identified the feature with the highest probability of being fixated. For each participant, we counted the number of differences from the mean for each of the three category groupings (A, B, and C/D). Summed together and converted to percentages, this provides an intuitive measure of how atypical each participant's temporal patterns of fixation were.
The difference scores ranged from 25% to 78%, with a mean of 46%. Most participants (67%) had difference scores of less than 50%. The individual participant data are noisy, but examining them reveals some interesting trends. For example, the participant with the highest difference scores tended to begin each trial by fixating on Feature 3, the least diagnostic feature of all, and proceeded to look at everything in no particular order. This is an extremely inefficient pattern of fixation but had no impact on the participant's accuracy. Other participants with high difference scores had equally inefficient patterns. For the participants with lower difference scores, the pattern of fixations to Category A stimuli was almost always very similar to the mean pattern. Differences for these participants were often due to a higher chance of looking at the irrelevant Feature 3 on Category B trials. For 9 participants, Feature 3 on Category B trials reached a peak after Features 1 and 2 reach theirs, which is compatible with our earlier suggestion that the high chance of fixating Feature 3 on these trials was due to overtraining the sequence of attentional shifts. This individual participant data suggests that some participants found it much harder than others to terminate such sequences.
Finally, 9 participants did not meet the learning criterion. On the final 24 trials, these participants had a mean accuracy of 58% correct, with a range from 29% to 96%. For these participants, we conducted an ANOVA to look for SRA (same as earlier). The Feature ϫ Category interaction did not reach significance, showing no sign of SRA (F Ͻ 1).
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 demonstrated that participants can deploy SRA. The temporal aspects of the data suggest a general pattern of fixating the features in order from most to least informative. One possibility is that participants might have deployed attention, albeit noisily, along a single route and responded once they had enough information to make an accurate classification. Although this has the effect of producing SRA, it may be that participants are limited to learning a single attentional path but that they can use stimulus information to abort when appropriate. This would be qualitatively different from and quite a bit more limited than current implementations of SRA, which allow as many different attentional allocations as there are exemplars in memory. Experiment 2 is designed to test this limitation with a new category structure as well as to generalize the findings from Experiment 1.
Experiment 2 uses a category structure that encourages participants to access different attentional paths depending on information present in the stimulus. As shown in Figure 1C , Categories A1 and A2 were defined by particular values of Features 1 and 2, and Categories B1 and B2 were defined by values of Features 1 and 3. In this way, participants can look at just two features for any stimulus, but which two depends on the stimulus. A failure to show SRA in this experiment would support the idea that SRA may be limited to cases where only a single attentional pattern is being followed. If we again found SRA, it would show that participants can deploy SRA for different kinds of category structures and would show that people can use at least two different sequences of attentional shifts, depending on stimulus properties.
Methods
Participants. Participants were 38 students at Simon Fraser University who received course credit or pay for their participation. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Procedure. There were two changes to the procedure in Experiment 2. First, we used a different category structure, shown in Figure 1C . Second, we no longer provided feedback after participants reached the learning criterion. Feedback was removed to investigate attentional changes in the absence of feedback, a topic outside the scope of this article (Blair, Watson, & Meier, 2009 ).
Results and Discussion
The learning criterion was reached in an average of 99 trials, and accuracy on the postcriterion trials was 99%. The point at which participants stopped making errors varied across categories. As in Experiment 1, we used 6 consecutive correct trials as our definition of learning for each category. On average, Category A1 was learned first, after 34 trials. Categories A2, B1, and B2 were learned in 45, 60, and 71 trials, respectively. This order is somewhat surprising, because in this experiment, unlike in Experiment 1, there was no difference in the number of features necessary to classify different categories. Indeed, because of counterbalancing, some participants had the same diagnostic features for Category B2 that others did for Category A1. Thus, the only difference among the categories was their labels, which shows the strong impact of alphanumeric ordering on categorization. Of the participants, 16 did not reach the learning criterion and were analyzed separately.
As in Experiment 1, we conducted an ANOVA to see if the pattern of attentional allocations differed according to the category to which it belonged. The two A categories shared the same relevant and irrelevant features (though not the same feature values), as did the two B categories. Because attentional patterns would have no reason to differ for these categories, we analyzed these pairs of categories as single groups, as with the C/D categories in the previous experiment. As shown in Figure 2B , participants attended differently to stimuli from different categories, F(2, 42) ϭ 32.4, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .62. This is, once again, clear evidence of stimulus-dependent attentional allocation. Pairwise comparisons confirmed that for Category A stimuli, both Feature 1 and Feature 2 were fixated more than Feature 3 ( ps Ͻ .05); similarly, for the Category B stimuli, Feature 1 and Feature 3 were fixated more than Feature 2 ( ps Ͻ .05). Because all categories had the same number of relevant and irrelevant features, there is no reason to expect differences in reaction time across the A and B categories. The mean reaction time for the final 72 trials was 2,759 ms.
The temporal data are shown in Figure 4 . We again conducted ANOVAs on the fixation probabilities with features (1-3) and time (1-12) as within-subjects variables. The Features ϫ Time interaction was significant for both Category A stimuli, F(22, 462) feature fixation probabilities on time. A further ANOVA that included category (1-3) confirmed, with a three-way interaction, that these significant temporal changes were not the same across both categories, F(22, 462) ϭ 19.21, p Ͻ .001, p 2 ϭ .48. Again, there are clear regularities in how likely features were to be fixated through a trial. Participants were most likely to begin by attending to Feature 1 but subsequently shifted their attention to either Feature 2 or Feature 3, depending on whether Feature 1 was consistent with A or B categories. This is different from Experiment 1, where participants always followed the same sequence of attentional shifts. The temporal pattern of attentional allocation to the relevant features was strikingly similar for trials from the two pairs of categories, the only difference being whether Feature 2 or Feature 3 was irrelevant. The fixation probability for this irrelevant feature was essentially constant once participants had shifted their attention away from the fixation cross at the beginning of the trial. If participants' fixations to irrelevant features were strategic-for example, if they occasionally accessed the irrelevant feature after looking at the relevant ones as a sort of double check-then we would see it in fixations in the temporal graphs. As it was, it seems that fixations to the irrelevant feature were essentially noise that was uniformly distributed in time.
We investigated individual differences with the same methodology as in Experiment 1: calculating how many times, for each participant, the feature with the highest probability of being fixated on during 1 of the 12 bins was different from the mean across all participants. Differences were lower than in Experiment 2: They ranged from 8% to 63%, and the average was 34%. Of the participants, 68% had difference scores of less than 50%. For all the participants with difference scores of less than 50%, Feature 1 had the highest chance of fixation at the beginning of each trial. Differences were often due to an increased chance of fixating on irrelevant features later in the trial. The 32% of all participants with difference scores of 50% or greater had highly idiosyncratic patterns of fixation. For example, the most atypical participant tended to begin each trial by fixating on Feature 2 and had a chance of fixating Feature 3 that rose steadily throughout the trial until it was the feature with the highest chance of fixation. Feature 1, the only feature that was always relevant, never had the highest chance of fixation for this participant. As in Experiment 1, such patterns of fixation were inefficient but did not impact accuracy.
There were more non-learners in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1, probably because there were no categories in Experiment 2 with single diagnostic features, which made the task more difficult. Non-learners in Experiment 2 had a mean accuracy of 56% correct, with a range from 13% to 92%. As with the nonlearners from Experiment 1, there was no significant Features ϫ Categories interaction for these participants, that is, no evidence of SRA.
General Discussion
In two experiments, we investigated the flexibility of learned attention. By using eye-tracking as a direct measure of overt attentional allocation and by using categories that differed in the relevance of their features, we sought to test whether human learned attention is more flexible than theories with task-specific attention suggest. Our data provide the first direct and unequivocal evidence that different stimuli in a categorization task can elicit different attentional allocations. Further, we found clear temporal regularities in how attention was allocated within a categorization trial. No categorization model that we are aware of addresses regularities at this subtrial level.
There are a variety of existing implementations of SRA that might be able to account for these results with only minor modifications (Aha & Goldstone, 1992; Kruschke, 2001; Love & Jones, 2006; Rodrigues & Murre, 2007) . To produce our results, it seems necessary to integrate information across multiple fixations, such that as information about the stimulus is gathered, the importance of the various features is adjusted, thereby changing the probabilities of fixating particular features. It should be noted that although most of the existing models gain their flexibility by allowing each stimulus to be associated with its own attentional allocation, to fit our data, they would require only the ability to allocate attention differently for each category.
Is There a Simpler Account?
One possible way that models that incorporate task-specific attention might work is if one slightly alters the typical definition of a categorization task by counting shifts of gaze as responses. A trial in our experiment could then be considered a series of subtasks linked together in a chain. A participant's response to information present in a stimulus feature could be a mouse click or an eye movement to focus on additional information, and the specific feature value determines which response occurs. For example, in the present Experiment 2, a participant might learn that the correct response to a particular Feature 1 value is to look at Feature 2 and that the correct response to one value of Feature 2 is to click A1 whereas the response to the other is A2. Participants might also learn that the correct response to the other value of Feature 1 is to look at Feature 3 and from there to respond either B1 or B2 depending on the value of Feature 3. In this way, attention may be deployed directly and simply, in response to associations made to the specific feature being fixated, rather than through complex SRA mechanisms that have to consider all the stimulus information together. This general account is similar to decision-tree models described by Trabasso, Rollins, and Shaughnessy (1971) . At first, this suggestion may seem promising. However, although this possibility is consistent with extant task-specific models, or even with simple associative-learning accounts, it is not consistent with our data.
The problem is that such simple chaining accounts predict that a very specific fixation order is necessary to produce a correct response. In Experiment 2, for instance, a participant might see a stimulus belonging to Category A1. Suppose participants first fixate on Feature 1, see a certain value, and "respond incorrectly" by fixating on Feature 3 (which is irrelevant), rather on than Feature 2 (which is relevant). The two values of Feature 3 are associated with the two B categories. Therefore, the final response will very likely also be wrong. If the final categorization decision is the result of a chain of decisions made on the basis of single stimulus features, then errors in the fixation order should lead to errors in the final response. Our data, however, do not support this proposal at all. Although there are clear temporal regularities in the order of fixation to features, there is also a significant amount of noise. In Experiment 1, there was an average chance of about 65% of fixating an irrelevant dimension on each of the final 72 trials. Despite this large probability of getting off track, nearly every participant had perfect performance. Similar to Experiment 2, the fixation probability for the irrelevant dimensions was near 70%, and again, these irrelevant fixations did not prevent most participants from getting perfect accuracy on the final categorization decision. Straightforward chaining models-whether simple conditioning models, full-blown task-specific attention exemplar models, or simple decision tree models-require efficient fixation patterns to produce effective categorization performance. In contrast, our data show that perfect accuracy does not require anything near perfect attentional efficiency. Therefore, an appropriate account seems to require a model that accumulates information about a stimulus with each new fixation and does not simply chain together independent decisions. Such a model could be considered as a complex decision tree, where responses are chosen probabilistically, and these probabilities could reflect all information obtained about the stimulus thus far, as well as the innate salience of each feature (which must be quite high, given the number of fixations to irrelevant features). This would be a form of SRA: Decisions are based on stimulus features (stimulus responsive) and the responses are eye movements (attention).
SRA and Known Neurophysiology
The neurophysiology of visual attention is quite capable of supporting SRA. For example, in the bilateral dorsal attentional network controlling voluntary spatial attention to visual stimuli (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Dias & Segraves, 1999; Knudsen, 2007; Winkowski & Knudsen, 2006) signals from the frontal eye fields both trigger eye movements (overt attention) and indirectly mediate processing in early visual areas in striate cortex (covert attention). However, this is not a unidirectional top-down flow of information. Projections from visual cortex also arrive at the frontal eye fields, and a similar sensory input to components that trigger attentional processes is found in a number of neurophysiologically inspired models of attention (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Deco & Rolls, 2005; Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Knudsen, 2007; Spratling & Johnson, 2006) . Such networks allow for a recurrent loop between attentional biases and perceptual processing. In this loop, stimulus features are processed according to attentional biases, but the results of this processing can change subsequent attentional biases to features of the same stimulus. This would allow different attentional allocations to stimuli on the basis of their features, in other words, SRA. Consider the bilateral dorsal network in the brains of our participants. At the beginning of a trial, the frontal eye fields were likely triggering eye movements toward Feature 1, as well as selectively modulating neuronal baselines in areas of primary visual cortex that correspond to the location of Feature 1. Once the feature was adequately processed, however, the results of this processing could then mediate activity in the frontal eye fields, which could then send signals to change attentional allocations appropriately. An electroencephalography or magnetoencephalography study of SRA might be able to uncover direct evidence of this loop in action.
When to Expect SRA
In the introductory section, we suggested that typical twocategory tasks are unlikely to elicit SRA, but this does not imply that the number of categories is the primary determinant of whether humans use SRA in a task. We hypothesize that efficiency is the primary motivator behind SRA and that one should expect to see participants using SRA in tasks where the most efficient allocations of attention differ for different stimuli. Thus, it is not surprising that previous studies using eye-tracking in categorization found no evidence of SRA, because in these studies, each feature's diagnosticity was constant across all stimuli (Rehder & Hoffman, 2005a) . This is also the case in most other commonly used categorization tasks; hence, we would not expect to see SRA in these tasks either. Rule-plus-exception tasks are one plausible situation where participants might use SRA, and our laboratory is currently trying to uncover others.
There are likely important limits to how responsive to stimuli attention can be. In our studies, for example, participants still attended to irrelevant features after mastering the categorization task. It seems likely that participants would attend even more to irrelevant features in a task with dozens of different categories, each with its own optimal attentional allocation. Perhaps there is some upper limit to how many variants of SRA one can keep in mind simultaneously, constrained by working memory capacities.
Reaction times can provide an indirect way of ruling out the presence of certain kinds of SRA. In our study, participants accessed new information several times in a given trial, and at any moment the choice of which information to access was strongly influenced by the information they had already accessed. At a minimum, this requires recurrent processing, which takes time. Distinguishing between animals and nonanimals, on the other hand, appears to be performed too rapidly for such recurrence, which has been presented as evidence that visual categorizations are performed by strictly feed-forward networks despite extensive back-projections in visual cortex (Serre, Oliva, & Poggio, 2007 ). This appears to be an overgeneralization, given that we found multiple shifts in attentional allocation in trials that could take less than 1 s. It may be that a task such as identifying living creatures is relatively hardwired, either innately or through overtraining; thus, there is no need for recurrent SRA. Different kinds of categorizations, then, elicit different levels of attentional flexibility.
A Broad Role for SRA
Our study found clear evidence of SRA, and we have suggested that this should be incorporated into existing categorization models. Some recent work suggests that stimulus responsivity may be an integral feature of several aspects of categorization. Lewandowsky (2003, 2004) reported on several experiments that provide evidence for stimulus-responsive choices between two possible categorization rules. In these studies, participants learned a complex categorization task with multiple category boundaries. In the primary condition, there was a contextual cue presented with the stimulus that could be used to determine which category boundary was appropriate. In training that took less than 1 hr, participants learned to use different categorization boundaries depending on the value of the cue. ATRIUM, a model with stimulusresponsive capabilities (Erickson & Kruschke, 1998) fit the data better than a model without (ALCOVE; Kruschke, 1992 In his study, participants seemed to choose rule-based processes (horizontal category boundaries) for some stimuli and exemplar processes (diagonal category boundaries) for other stimuli. Erickson found that participants took longer to respond if they switched representations from the previous trial. Further, he found that if participants chose to solve the categorization problem with multiple representations, their performance was related to their working memory span, but if they used a single representation, it was not. How representational attention might be related to the stimulus-responsive gaze shifts we report here, particularly neurophysiologically, is as yet unknown.
Overt Attention Versus Dimensional Attention Weights
As it currently stands, what most models of categorization mean by attention is the combination of all the visual and cognitive biases present in the entire cognitive system. Eye-tracking could be criticized on the grounds that the overt attention it tracks is not the same as the kind of whole-system attentional emphasis indicated by dimensional weights, and so it cannot be used to evaluate those kinds of models. This apparent conceptual mismatch is unfortunate but not unexpected. Dimension weights are simplifications, after all, and were used before there was anywhere near the current understanding of overt and covert attentional processes. Because of the breadth of cognitive processes subsumed in these weights, it is difficult for us to image any measure of neural or ocular-motor behavior that could capture everything they subsume. Nevertheless, as we outlined in the introductory section, there is a tight coupling between overt and covert forms of attention under normal conditions in a variety of tasks. Further, there is evidence that measures of gaze match dimensional attention predictions in categorization tasks, both qualitatively-eye movements show that irrelevant information is not fixated-and quantitatively-gaze data correlate with dimensional weight values produced by fitting models to data. These facts justify a fairly straightforward mapping between measures of gaze and dimensional attention.
It is certain that modeling attention purely on the basis of eye movements will be incomplete, but one has to start somewhere. When evidence arises that participants are attending in ways that are not captured by the eye movements (remembering that such evidence does not yet exist for categorization tasks), then additional aspects of attention (e.g., decisional attention; Maddox & Dodd, 2003) can be added as necessary. This may mean extending current models like ATRIUM, with its idea of representational attention (Erickson & Kruschke, 1998) , or the extended generalized context model, with its idea of differing rates of information extraction (Lamberts, 2000) . It may mean making new models specifically designed to account for eye movements (Nelson & Cottrell, 2007) . We hope that models will begin to incorporate eye-movement data in the same way that they are increasingly incorporating neurophysiological data (e.g., Pauli & O'Reilly, 2008; Spratling & Johnson, 2006) . Though this process may be awkward at first because the interactions between overt and covert attention are not yet clear, eye-tracking and measures of other attentional processes will yield much new data, and the field will eventually build a more complex, complete, and accurate notion of the role of attention in categorization.
Research into overt and covert forms of attention has flourished in the past quarter century. This research has provided greater understanding of eye movements in reading, visual search, scene perception, and real world tasks; has uncovered burst cells, omnipause cells, and other neural features in the brainstem and elsewhere that control saccadic programming; and has discovered and mapped out executive attentional brain networks. Much progress has been made. By sharing methodologies (like eye-tracking) and concepts (like overt attention) with other visual cognition researchers, we enable the maximum amount of cross-fertilization and the most progress. It is our hope that the experiments presented here can provide some additional impetus to take eye-tracking seriously and to see the goal of understanding attention in categorization as related to the goal of understanding attention generally.
